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SOME EMENDATIONS OF GODEI.:S
ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
C. Anthony Anderson

Kurt Godel's version of the ontological argument was shown by J. Howard
Sobel to be defective, but some plausible modifications in the argument result
in a version which is immune to Sobel's objection. A definition is suggested
which permits the proof of some of Godel's axioms.

A new version of the ontological argument for the existence of God was
outlined by Kurt Godel and elaborated by Dana Scott. J. Howard Sobel has
given a careful explication of the details and has provided a powerful critique l , I believe that Sobel's main objection is conclusive against the argument as sketched by Godel. But it is possible to correct the argument, making
changes which can be independently motivated, and in such a way that the
revised argument is immune to the objection. And a definition of one of
Godel's primitive concepts enables the proof of some of his axioms. For the
sake of those who do not enjoy symbolism, I give a statement of Godel's
argument and the suggested revisions in the vernacular. Some corollaries and
a lemma have been separated off in order to clarify the proof and to isolate
the difficulty. A brief statement of the formalities is given in the appendix.
To see a full formalization of Godel's original version, consult Sobel.
1. GOdel's Axioms, Definitions, and Theorems

Axiom 1. A property is positive if and only if its negation is not positive.
The notion of a positive property is taken as a primitive. Godel suggests
two readings-"positive in the moral-aesthetic sense" and positive as involving only "pure attribution." The only further comment in the notes on the
first interpretation is to the effect that positiveness in this sense is independent
of the "accidental structure of the world." The second notion is said to be
"opposed to 'privation'" and to pertain to properties which do not contain
privation. (The explanations in Godel's notes are extremely terse and sometimes cryptic). Even the sympathetic reader still may not find Axiom 1 intuitively evident. I discuss this below.
Axiom 2. Any property entailed by a positive property is itself positive.
"Entailed" is understood to mean "strictly implied" -in this case, that it is
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impossible for something to have the one property and not the other. Let us
say that a property is consistent if it is possibly exemplified, i.e., if it is
possible that there exists an x such that x has that property. And let us say
that a property is necessary if it is necessary that everything has the property.
Then:
Theorem 1. If a property is positive, then it is consistent.
Proof Let <I> be a positive property. Then <I> entails the property of selfidentity-since every property entails the necessary property of self-identity.
Hence, self-identity is positive by Axiom 2. So, by Axiom 1, the negation of
self-identity, self-difference, is not positive. But if <I> is inconsistent, it entails
self-difference-since an inconsistent property entails everything. This contradicts Axiom 2. So every positive property is consistent. 2

Q.E.D.
The alleged modal facts used in proving Theorem I-that a necessary
property is entailed by every property and that an inconsistent property entails
every property-may strike the modally naive as unintuitive. Indeed, it strikes
some of the modally sophisticated thus. But given the explained meaning of
"entails," these "paradoxes of strict implication" (as they have been called)
are entirely unproblematic. If it is not possible that x lack <1>, then it is not
possible that x have 'I' and lack <I>-so any property entails such a property
<1>. And if it is not possible that x have r., then it is not possible that x has r.
and lacks '1'. So such a property r. entails every property.
Definition 1. x is God-like if and only if x has every positive property.
Axiom 3. The property of being God-like is positive.
It's worth noticing that there is here an implicit assumption: if we have
defined a predicate, then we can straight-away form a name of the property
which it expresses. (The technically minded will thus wish to note that it is
in effect assumed that anything is counted as a property which can be defined
by "abstraction on a formula.")
Corollary 1. The property of being God-like is self-consistent, i.e. possibly
exemplified.
Proof By Axiom 3 and Theorem 1.
Lemma. If something is God-like, then each of its properties is positive.
Proof. Suppose that something x is God-like. Let 'I' be any property of x.
If 'I' is not positive, then its negation is (by Axiom 1). By definition, x, being
God-like, has every positive property. But then x would exemplify the negation of 'I'-contrary to our assumption that x has '1'. Hence 'I' is positive.

Q.E.D.
Definition 2. A property <I> is an essence of entity x if and only if x has <I>
and <I> entails every property x has.
Godel VetS a great admirer of Leibniz 3 and this definition shows that influ-
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ence. I suggest below that a more conservative characterization of essence
better serves the purpose at hand.
Axiom 4. If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive. 4
Theorem 2. If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like
is an essence of that thing.
Proof. Suppose that something x is God-like and let 'I' be any property of
x. Then'll is positive by the lemma. Now by definition (of "God-like"),
necessarily if 'I' is positive, anything which is God-like has'll. Hence, if
necessarily'll is positive, then necessarily anything which is God-like has'll
(by modal logic). But by Axiom 4, if'll is positive, necessarily'll is positive.
Therefore, necessarily'll is positive. So necessarily anything which is Godlike has 'I'-Le., the property of being God-like entails'll. Thus we have
shown that any property of x is entailed by the property of being God-like.
So, by the definition of "essence," the property of being God-like is an
essence of anything which has that property.

Q.E.D.
The modal principle used in the proof of Theorem 2 is that if it is necessary
that if P, then Q, then if it is necessary that P, it is necessary that Q.
Corollary 2. If x is God-like and has a property, then that property is
entailed by the property of being God-like.
The corollary is immediate by the definition of "essence" and Theorem 2.
This consequence of the axioms is at the heart of Sobel's objection, to be
explained below.
Definition 3. x necessarily exists if and only if every essence of x is necessarily exemplified (Le., for every $, if $ is an essence of x, then necessarily
there exists a y such that y has $).
Note that while necessary existence is taken to be a property, it seems
perfectly well-defined: it is defined as the property attributed to anything x
when it is asserted that every essence $ of x is such that necessarily (3x)$x.
(Technically, it is definable by abstraction on a second order formula). Actual
existence may be taken to be expressed by the natural language counterpart
of a quantifier, although one could also define a corresponding property of a
thing x: every essence $ of x is such that something is a $.
Axiom 5. The property of necessarily existing is a positive property.
Theorem 3. Necessarily the property of being God-like is exemplified.
Proof. If something x is God-like, then it has every positive property (by
definition) and hence (by Axiom 5) it has the property of necessarily existing.
That is, if x is God-like, then any essence of x is necessarily exemplified
(definition of "necessary existence"). But if x is God-like, then the property
of being God-like is an essence of x, by Theorem 2. Therefore, if anything
x is God-like, then necessarily the property of being God-like is exemplified.
Hence, if something is God-like, then necessarily something is God-like.
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Since this last has been proved using only necessary truths, it is itself a
necessary truth. Therefore, if it is possible that something is God-like, then
it is possible that necessarily something is God-like (by modal logic). But by
Corollary 1, it is possible that something is God-like. Therefore, it is possible
that necessarily something is God-like. So, necessarily something is God-like
(by the modal logic S5)5.
Q.E.D.
The principles of modal logic used in this proof are: (1) if it is necessary
that if P, then Q, then if it is possible that P, then it is possible that Q, and
the principle of S5, (2) if it is possible that it is necessary that P, then it is
necessary that P.

II. Sobel's Objections
The reasoning is entirely cogent. Unfortunately, too much follows from
these axioms. Sobel shows that the axioms engender "modal collapse"-it
follows from them that every proposition which is true at all is necessary.
Suppose x is God-like and the proposition P is true. Then x has the property of being such that P is true. So by Corollary 2, this property is entailed
by the property of being God-like-which latter is necessarily exemplified, by Theorem 3. Hence the property of being such that P is true is
necessarily exemplified. Therefore, it is necessary that P. Again, the reasoning seems correct. (In his formalized version of this argument, Sobel
uses the property which anything has when it is self-identical and P is
true. Some may find this version slightly more intuitive.) Arguing along
similar lines, Sobel concludes that it follows further that everything necessarily exists. Simplifying just a bit, the argument is this. Let x be the
necessarily existing God-like being and consider any y distinct from x and
having essence <1>. Then the necessarily existing God-like being x has the
property of being such that there is something y, distinct from x and having
essence <1>. This complex property, being entailed by the necessarily exemplified property of God-likeness, is itself necessarily exemplified and
thus it is necessary there is such a y with essence <1>. This last is tantamount
to y's necessary existence. I see no reasonable escape from Sobel's conclusions here.
III. Analysis of the Difficulty

Sobel suggests that a natural reaction might be to reject Axiom 5 and to give
up on the ontological argument. (Sobel himself believes that ontological arguments have more serious and fundamental difficulties-we do not discuss these
here). But Axiom 5 is certainly not the least plausible of the axioms. And one
might agree with David Lewis6 when he says that the ontological arguer is
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entitled to whatever standards of greatness (or positiveness, in the present
case) he wants. Of course one can't then just stipulate that Axioms 1 and 2
are true-there might be a clash with the standards or with one another. And
positiveness should be theologically significant (as again Lewis notes). But
given this, it would be difficult to find fault with Axiom 5. Even without this,
Axiom 5 has considerable intrinsic plausibility.
Consider the puzzling Axiom 1. If we separate it into the two conditionals:
(la) If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive,
(lb) If the negation of a property is not positive, then the property is
positive,
we find principles of rather different character. Chisholm and Sosa 7 have
developed the logic of intrinsic value as attributed to states of affairs and
there are analogies with the idea of a positive property (if we take this latter
in the "moral aesthetic" sense). In particular, we can deduce (la) from the
two plausible principles about intrinsic preferability:
(Bl) If a property is positive, then it is preferable to (or better than) its
negation.
(B2) If a property cl> is preferable to property 'P, then 'P is not preferable
to cl>.
These are analogues of certain theorems of Chisholm and Sosa 8 •
Principle (lb), on the other hand, seems to overlook a possibility: that both
a property and its negation should be indifferent. For example, being such
that there are stones does not seem to be intrinsically preferable to its
negation nor does its negation seem to be preferable to it-hence neither
it nor its negation is positive (according to (Bl». So we should reject
Axiom 1, delete the dubious part (I b), and adopt (Ia) as our new axiom;
call it now" Axiom 1*." Notice that (1 b) is used in the proof of the lemma
which, by way of Theorem 2, is involved in the proof of the troublesome
Corollary 2.9

IV. New Definitions and Corresponding Axioms
Another change which seems advisable is this: a property should be defined
to be an essence of an entity x when it is a property which entails all and
only the essential properties of x-those properties which x has necessarily.
There's nothing to argue about-here is a different conception of the essence
of something, call it ~essence*":
Definition 2*. cl> is an essence * of x if and only if for every property 'P, x
has 'P necessarily (or essentially) if and only if cl> entails 'P.1O
Finally, I advocate that the property of being God-like, call it now ~God
likeness*," be defined as follows:
Definition 1 *. x is God-like * if and only if x has as essential properties
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those and only those properties which are positive (i.e., for every <1>, x has <I>
necessarily if and only if <I> is positive).
Having only positive properties is, I think, too much to ask. Of an
indifferent property and its negation God must have one. But having all
and only the positive properties as essential properties is plausibly definitive
of divinity.
These changes are theologically very pleasant: the proof of Theorem 1 still
goes through (using Axiom 1*, i.e. (la), in place of the rejected Axiom 1),
the proof of the despised Corollary 2 is blocked (depending as it does on the
old definition of "essence"), and we can still prove a theorem corresponding
to Theorem 2-but now using our new definitions.
Note that the definition of necessary existence now to be used is of the
same form as the original definition but has "essence*" in place of "essence."
If we call this new notion "necessary existence*," then our new axioms are
Axioms 1*, 2, and 4 and, in place of Axioms 3 and 5, respectively,:
Axiom 3*. The property of being God-like* is positive, and
Axiom 5*. Necessary existence* is positive. And we prove:
Theorem 2*. If something is God-like*, then the property of being Godlike* is an essence* of that thing.
Proof Suppose that x is God-like* and necessarily has a property 'P. Then
by definition (of "God-like*"), that property is positive. But necessarily, if
'P is positive, then if anything is God-like*, then it has 'P-again by the
definition of "God-like* ," together with the fact that if something has a
property necessarily, then it has the property. But if a property is positive,
then it is necessarily positive (Axiom 4). Hence, if'P is positive, then it is
entailed by being God-like* (by modal logic-as in the original Theorem 2).
But 'P is positive and hence is entailed by being God-like*. Thus we have
proved that if an entity is God-like* and has a property essentially, then that
property is entailed by the property of being God-like*.
Suppose a property <I> is entailed by the property of being God-like*. Then
<I> is positive by Axioms 2 and 3* and therefore, since x is God-like*, x has
<I> necessarily (by the definition of "God-like*"). Hence, if something is
God-like*, it has a property essentially if and only if that property is entailed
by being God-like-i.e., God-likeness* is an essence* of that thing.
Q.E.D.
That the property of being God-like* is necessarily exemplified follows
much as before (except that one must use the modal principle "If necessarily
P, then P" also in the proof of Theorem 3*). That there is at most one
God-like* being also follows: if x and yare both God-like*, then y has the
same essential properties as x, including identity with x.
Someone might worry that perhaps the emended axioms still lead to modal
collapse. On at least one reasonable way of formalizing the proof, they do
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not. Symbolic versions of these axioms are satisfiable in a "possible worlds"
model of second-order S5 of the sort explained by Nino Cocchiarella ll and
such that "for all P, if P, then necessarily P" is false therein. Take a model
containing just two possible worlds WI and W2 and just two (possible) entities
a and b. Let a exist at both WI and W2 and let b exist only at WI. (The
contingent entity b is merely possible at W2). A property is a function which
picks out a set of individuals (the extension of the property) at each possible
world. 12 Since one cannot represent directly in second-order logic propositions ofthe form "4> is positive" (with the property expression in the argument
place)13, let us temporarily define this as "the negation (or complement) of
the property 4> entails property t:r,." (intuitively, a property is defined as positive if its lack entails a defect). For the purpose of the example, identify
property t:r,. with the property of being a contingent being-the function that
picks out the set containing b alone at WI and at W2. It is tedious, but not
difficult, to show that being God-like* and necessary existence* are both
positive-indeed, they are both identified in the model with that function
which picks out a at every possible world (this is also the essence of a), a
property whose complement entails (in the model) contingent existence. All
the other axioms (using the definition) come out true in this (S5) structure as
well. Taking WI to be the actual world, there are true but contingent propositions-for example, that there are at least two things.14
The idea used in the model suggests a simplification of the axioms. (Actually
it was the idea of the simplification that suggested the model). Take as a new
primitive the idea of something's being imperfect (or, what is not quite the same,
being defective). Then just define a property to be positive if its absence in an
entity entails that the entity is imperfect and its presence does not entail that the
entity in question is imperfect. A little more formally, we may say that a property
4> is positive if and only if (1) necessarily for every x, if x does not have 4>,
then x is imperfect and (2) it is not necessary that for every x, if x has 4>,
then x is imperfect. IS A little less formally, we explain that a property is
positive if and only if it is necessary for, and compatible with, perfection.
Axioms 1*, 2, and 4 are then provable as theorems in modal logic. (The second
conjunct in the definition is needed to prove Axiom 1*). But note that, on this
definition, to assert that being God-like* is positive is already to assert that
being God-like* does not entail any imperfection. And if being God-like* were
not self-consistent, then it would entail everything. So asserting that the property is positive is quite close to the outright assertion of self-consistency.
Theorem 1 does not then seem to give us much new assurance about the
possible exemplification of God-likeness. But there seems to be no epistemic
loss and the logical economy gained is of some independent interest. 16
It is hoped that the suggested changes preserve at least some of the
essentials of Godel's proof. One may doubt that an ontological argument
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will ultimately succeed and yet still hold that reason demands consideration
of the best arguments that can be constructed-on both sides of the question
of God's existence. If Kurt Godel thought that the matter can be settled in
the affirmative by proof, perhaps those of us who are interested in the question
ought to see what merit we can find in his line of reasoning. 17

University of Minnesota

NOTES
1. Jordan Howard Sobel, MG6del's Ontological Proof," in On Being and Saying. Essays
for Richard Cartwright, ed. Judith Jarvis Thomson (Cambridge, Mass. & London, England: The MIT Press, 1987). Sobel provides detailed renderings of both G6del's handwritten note and Scott's elaboration. Apparently the contents of these have not appeared
in print before.
2. One of the anonymous referees pointed out that there is a simpler proof of this which
does not require the use of self-identity and self-difference. Suppose 41 were positive and
inconsistent. Then it would entail its own negation, which would have to be positive by
Axiom 2. But this contradicts Axiom 1.
3. According to Hao Wang, Reflections on Kurt Godel (Cambridge, Mass. & London:
The MIT Press, 1987).
4. Strictly speaking, the proof requires the necessitation of this axiom-that a property
is positive entails that it is necessarily positive. In the proof of Theorem 2 below it is
asserted that a conditional (namely, MIf something is God-like, then necessarily something
is God-like.") has been proved using only necessary truths. Other than definitions, the
only thing required is that Axiom 4 be necessary. But probably no one who accepts the
axioms will shrink from asserting all their necessitations.
5. Because of the arguments of Hugh Chandler (MPlantinga and the Contingently
Possible," Analysis 36 (1976): 106-109) elaborated by Nathan Salmon (Reference and
Essence (Princeton University Press and Basil Blackwell, 1981), section 28, pp. 229-52;
MImpossible Worlds," Analysis 44 (1984); Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points
and Counterpoints," in French, Uehling, and Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy Xl: Studies in Essentialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986):
75-120; and MOn the Logic of What Might Have Been," Philosophical Review (forthcoming», I have begun to worry that S5 may not be the appropriate modal logic for de re
modality. For the purpose of proving Theorem 3, it would actually suffice to use the
weaker modal logic B, but Salmon (in the last mentioned article) casts doubt on this as
well-and in any case it does not appear that the logical weakening corresponds to any
epistemic advance. (That the modal principle of B, MIf it is possibly necessary that P, then
P," will work just as well as S5 for certain modal ontological arguments was to my
knowledge first noticed in print by Robert Merrihew Adams, MThe Logical Structure of
Anselm's Arguments," The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 28-54). These criticisms
cause no difficulty in the present case since the only uses of the characteristic principles
of S5 are applications to de dicto modalities. Perhaps it would be better to isolate the de
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re by introducing a new primitive 'Essentl(<I>,x)' meaning that <I> is an essential property
of x and then to adopt the axiom: if Essentl(<I>,x), then <I>(x). The proofs go through as
before using 'Essent1(<I>,x)' in place of 'necessarily x has <1>.' Also this would focus (but
presumably not alleviate) any worries someone may have about Kquantifying in."
6. David Lewis, KAnselm and Actuality," Nalls 4 (1970): 175-88. Reprinted in Readings
in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach, ed. Baruch A. Brody (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1974).
7. Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa, KOn the Logic of 'Intrinsically Better,'"
American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966): 244-249.
8. But notice that the Chisholm-Sosa definition of an Kintrinsically good state of affairs"
as a state of affairs which is preferable to some indifferent state of affairs is not the
appropriate analogue of the idea of a positive property. A positive property, in GOdel's
sense, is purely positive-it entails only properties which are themselves positive. A good
state of affairs, in the Chisholm-Sosa sense, may entail indifferent or even bad states of
affairs. A definition which might do is this: a property is positive if and only if every
property <I> it entails is such that <I> is preferable to the negation of <1>. This definition has
some of the same advantages and drawbacks as the definition considered below. One
additional advantage is that it is then possible to prove Axiom 1 from the principle that
preferability is asymmetric. The analogue of this for states of affairs is an axiom of the
Chisholm-Sosa calculus. But which definition is to be used depends largely on theological
considerations. Alternatively, one might adopt no definition at all.
9. There may be something to be said for (lb) from the point of view of Godel's other
interpretation of positiveness as involving only Kpure attribution." I do not fully understand this alternative but one might suppose that (lb) is a principle of Kfullness of being."
But, as noted, (lb) entails the lemma (that if something is God-like, then each of its
properties is positive). Below we prove a theorem corresponding to Theorem 2 (which
seems crucial to the idea of the main proof), but with new definitions of KGod-like" and
Kessence." There does not follow from this anything corresponding to Corollary 2 (because
of the new definition of Kessence"), but in the presence of (lb), a correlate of the lemma
can still be proved. This and the new version of Theorem 2 again pennit an argument like
Sobel's to the conclusion that everything which is true is necessary. We assume that most
will find this consequence unacceptable.
10. This definition is equivalent to a definition of essence which is now quite standard:
an essence is an essential property of something which only it has in any possible world.
Proof sketch: Suppose <I> is a property which entails all and only x's essential properties.
Then since <I> entails itself, it is an essential property of x. Further, if something else had
<I> (in some possible world), then it would have x's essential property of being identical
with x and so would itself be identical with x.
Suppose now that <I> is an essential property of x which only x has in any possible world.
Let 'P be an essential property of x. Then if, in some possible world, something y has <1>,
y is identical with x and thus has 'P in that world. So <I> entails 'P. For the converse, assume
that <I> entails some property 'P. Then x will have 'P in every possible world in which it
has <1>. Therefore, since <I> is an essential property of x, 'P is also an essential property of
x. (The reader who wants to fonnalize this reasoning in the system of Note 11 is advised
to take all quantifiers to be Ksubsistential" or Kpossibilist"-see further Note 14).
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The use of the idea of an essential property in dealing with the difficulty corresponds
to an observation Sobel makes that one might only require of a God-like being that its
"intrinsic" properties be positive.
11. Nino B. Cocchiarella, "A Completeness Theorem in Second Order Modal Logic,"
Theoria 35 (1969): 81-103.

12. I do not accept this identification in general. Nothing really turns on it in connection
with the use of the model to show that there is no modal collapse. One can think of these
functions as the "spectra" of properties without any damage to purpose at hand.
13. We could of course extend the logic to third order but this would require some
elaboration of Cocchiarella 's semantics.
14. One should consult Cocchiarella's article for a detailed and precise account of his
semantics for second-order modal logic. But, at least for those having some familiarity
with the usual "possible world" approach, the following outline of the semantics may
make it possible to see that there is no modal collapse. We are to imagine given a set I of
"possible worlds" where each such world has associated with it an "L-model," a triple
consisting of a set A (the individuals existing in the world), a set B (the possible
individuals; the set of actual individuals must be a. subset of this set) and an interpretation
function R which assigns appropriate extensions to the constants of the language-possible individuals to individual constants, sets of possible individuals to one-place predicates
and so on. It is worth emphasizing that the denotation of a constant (as given by R) at a
world and the extension of a predicate (also given by R) at a world need not consist of
individuals which are "actual" at the world. And Cocchiarella's logic has two kinds of
quantifiers: what we might call "subsistential quantifiers" which (in the semantics) are
construed as ranging over all possible individuals (the set B), and "e-quantifiers," "existence quantifiers," which are interpreted at a world as ranging only over the entities which
exist in that world (the set A). The logic is interpreted by giving a "world system"-a
collection of such L-models, one for each possible world i belonging to I, it being required
that the possible individuals of each L-model be the same as those of any other (the
possible individuals are the same no matter what world you are in). (Technically the
L-models are "indexed"; the set I is the domain of a function which yields an L-model
for each i belonging to I). And the existing individuals of all the worlds, taken together,
must be a subset of the set of possible individuals. A singular attribute is as usual a function
which takes as arguments possible worlds and yields as value in each case a set of possible
individuals. And we may take the one-place second-order variables as ranging over all the
attributes which correspond to a given world system (Cocchiarella has two kinds of
second-order quantifiers, but only one is relevant to our present concern). The n-ary
attributes are defined analogously. Ignoring for simplicity some not-immediately-relevant
complications of Cocchiarella's actual construction, our desired world system may be
taken to contain two possible worlds 1 and 2 and corresponding L-models Al = <{a,b},
{a,b}, R I> and A2 = < {a}, {a,b}, R2>. The first set listed in each case contains the actual
individuals of the world, the second contains the possible individuals, and Rj assigns
extensions (from the second set) at the world to the constants and predicates of the
language. The singularly attributes of the world system are therefore all the functions
whose ranges consists of just the two worlds and whose values are in each case sets of
possible individuals. The n-ary attributes (n > 1) of the world system are defined analo-
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gously (although we do not actually care about them for the present purpose). Now use
the notation 'cI>aV' to stand for the attribute that picks out singleton a at the world 1
(corresponding to AI) and picks out the set of all possible individuals V = {a,b} at world
2 (corresponding to A2), with analogous notation for the other fifteen attributes which
exist in this world system. Then take RI(,a') '" R2('a') '" cI>bb. It is easy to check that the
only positive attributes (those whose negations entail cI>bb) are cI>aa, cI>vv, cI>WJ, and cI>av,
and that the first of these is the attribute corresponding to 'G' and 'NE' and is the unique
essence of a. Note well that the appropriate translation of the argument into Cocchiarella's
notation will take the existential quantifier in the definition of necessary existence to be
an e-quantifier (an "existence," rather than "subsistence," quantifier) and so too the
quantifier in the conclusion of the argument. All others individual quantifiers may be taken
to be subsistential and hence to range over all possibles. It is a purely combinatorial task
to show that the modified GOdelian axioms all come out true in this model and that there
is no modal collapse. And not everything is a necessary existent. Cocchiarella proves that
his axioms for second-order S5 are complete in the "Henkin-sense." Given the definition
of "positive property," one can completely formalize the present ontological proof in that
system. Thus, there is at least one formalization of the present proof using a reasonably
adequate logic in which no modal collapse is demonstrable.
15. The idea of this simplification is based on that of Alan R. Anderson, "A Reduction
of Deontic Logic to Alethic Modal Logic," Mind 67 (1958): 100-103. The model outlined
still shows that there is no modal collapse even if we regard positiveness as thus defined.
The positive properties of the model tum out to be the same as before.
16. I personally do not find G5del's proof of possibility very reassuring. Consideration
of the axioms, especially Axiom 2, may tend to dampen one's confidence in Axioms 3
and 5-that is, if one harbors any real doubt about self-consistency. I don't say that the
argument begs the question of possibility; the charge is too difficult to establish. But
observe that one cannot just tell by scrutinizing a property what it entails; one might be
surprised at a consequence. Thus it may not be so obvious that being God-like is positive,
given that positiveness obeys Axiom 2. The best course for ontological arguers may just
be to take the possibility as an axiom and rebut attempts to show inconsistency. Of course
the model for the modified axioms shows that there is in that case no danger of formal
inconsistency.
In some respects Axiom 3 does not seem to do full justice to GOdel's intentions. (Axiom
3 appears in Dana Scott's notes and is presumably his explication of G5del's sketch). In
his notes G5del assumes instead an axiom that the conjunction of any two positive
properties is positive and adds that this is so for any number of conjuncts ("summands")presumably meaning to include an infinite number as well (See Sobel). If we think of the
property of having all positive properties as such a conjunction (instead of what it is-a
property involving universal quantification), then the positiveness of being God-like (as
defined by Godel) is included. It may be that a principle along these general lines can be
used to give a plausible argument for the new version of Axiom 3 (with the modified
definition of "God-like").
17. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for substantial improvements in both form
and content.
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APPENDIX

1. Gijdel's Axioms, Definitions, and Theorems
Pos(<I»: <I> is positive
-S: It is not the case that S
-<I>: The property attributed to anything x when it is asserted that x is not a <I>

Os: It is necessary that S
os: It is possible that S
Axiom 1. Pos(<I» == -Pos(-<I»
We write (<I>-'P) for [J(x)(<I>(x) :::>'P(x)).
Axiom 2. Pos(<I» :::> [ (<I>-'P) :::> Pos('P)]
Definition 1. G(x) = df (<I»(pos(<I» :::> <I>(x))
Axiom 3. Pos(G)

(God-like)

Theorem 1. Pos(<I» :::> O(:3x)<I>(x)
Corollary 1. O(:3x)G(x)
Lemma. G(x) :::> (<I»(<I>(x) :::> Pos(<I»)
Definition 2. <I> &5 x =df <I>(x) . ('P)['P(x) :::>

(<I>~'P)]

(&sence)

Axiom 4. Pos(<I» :::> DPos(<I»
Theorem 2. G(x) :::> (G &5 x)
Corollary 2. G(x) :::> [<I>(x) :::> (G~<I»]
Definition 3. NE(x) =df (<1»[<1> &5 x :::> [J(:3x)<I>(x)]
Axiom 5. Pos(NE)

(Necessary Existence)

II. Sobel's Objections
It follows that P :::> DP and that (y)NE(y)

III. Analysis of the Difficulty
(la) Pos(<I» :::> -Pos(-<I»
(lb) -Pos(-<I» :::> Pos(<I»
<l>B'P : <I> is better than (or preferable to) 'II
(Bl) Pos(<I» :::> (<I>B-<I»
(B2) (<I>B'P) :::> - ('PB<I»

IV. New Definitions and Corresponding Axioms
Definition 1 *. G*(x) =df (<1»[ [JI>(x)== Pos (<1»]
Definition 2*. <I> &5* x =df ('P)

ro 'P(x) ==

(<I>='P)]

Definition 3*. NE*(x) =df (<1»[<1> &5* x:::> D (:3x) <I> (x)]

(God-like*)
(Essence*)
(ecessary existence*)

(If this symbolism is transcribed into Cocchiarella's logic for the purpose of construct-
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ing a fonnal proof, the existential quantifier in the definition of MNE*" should be taken to
be an Me-quantifier").
Axiom 3* Pos(G*)

Axiom 5* Pos(NE*)
a(x): x is imperfect (defective)
Definition. Pos (eI» =df(-eI>=>a). -(eI>=>a)

(positive property)

